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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we investigate the trade-off between the needs for budget 
consolidation and the desirability of expansionary fiscal policies as a means 
of demand management by simulating alternative scenarios with a 
macroeconometric model of the Slovenian economy. The simulations show 
that for the Slovenian economy an expansionary fiscal policy is neither 
feasible nor desirable: it leads to unsustainable government debt and has 
only weak effects on income and employment. It turns out that that the 
Stability Programme of the Slovenian government and the related policy 
prescriptions of the EU lead to reasonable results in terms of public debt 
without strong adverse effects on output and unemployment. An 
expansionary fiscal policy is not desirable as it results in unsustainable 
public debt without enhancing employment and output sufficiently.  
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1. Introduction 
 
As a consequence of the “Great Recession”, the financial and economic 
crisis since 2007, many countries have to struggle with the problem of 
increasing government debt. Government budget deficits occurred through 
reactions of automatic stabilizers and as a result of discretionary fiscal 
policy measures aiming at supporting aggregate demand. Not only those 
countries which entered the crisis with already high public debt were 
affected but also some fiscally sound ones faced the problem of 
unsustainable sovereign debt. In the European Union, the government debt 
issue is felt particularly hard for two reasons: on the one hand, the EU has 
set itself the goal of reducing national debt levels to 60 percent of GDP and 
government deficits to 3 percent of GDP or below already in the Maastricht 
Treaty and has attempted to enforce these targets through the Stability and 
Growth Pact, although with only limited success. On the other hand, some 
EU member states, which gained from reduced interest rates through the 
membership in the monetary union, were tempted to pursue expansionary 
policies until financial markets recognized the danger of their debt 
becoming unsustainable and began to fear that these countries might be 
confronted with sovereign default. As a result, interest rates increased and 
the so-called periphery of the EU (especially some southern countries like 
Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Cyprus) were caught in a trap of high 
and increasing public debt and decreasing national income (see e.g. Fenz 
et al. 2012). 
The present situation in these EU countries is therefore characterized by a 
hard choice for fiscal policy makers due to the trade-off between the tasks 
of reducing public debt and stimulating income and employment. The 
strategy of the EU Commission aims at fulfilling both tasks by concentrating 
on budget consolidation through restrictive fiscal policies while assigning 
the target of income growth to structural measures invigorating labor and 
goods markets. This is met with increasing criticism from the public, 
politicians and also many economists who claim that an expansionary 
course of fiscal policy is required to return to a growth path in the weak 
economies of the EU periphery. According to this view, the present 
austerity prescriptions are not remedies but door openers for the way into 
an even deeper crisis, and an expansionary policy through additional 
government expenditures, especially investment, is called for. 
In this paper, we attempt to shed some light on this question by considering 
a small EU member country that has been confronted by the above 
mentioned trade-off recently, namely Slovenia. Slovenia until the “Great 
Recession” was relatively successful in managing its economy after 
entering the EU in 2004 and the Eurozone in 2007. However, it was hit hard 
by the international crisis in 2009, with real GDP decreasing by 7.8 percent, 
and was confronted with an exploding public debt afterwards. The public 
debt to GDP ratio increased from 22.0 percent of GDP in 2008 to 54.1 
percent in 2012, with a further increase being expected by all forecasts. At 
the same time, real GDP decreased by 2.3 percent in 2012, and the future 
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prospects are likewise gloomy. Although the situation is mostly judged to be 
less threatening than in higher indebted countries in Slovenia itself 
(Braniselj 2011), the Slovenian case can serve to illustrate the dilemma of 
fiscal policy between austerity and demand management in a member state 
of the Eurozone today.          
 
 
2.  The Slovenian Stability Programme 
 
Like other countries in the Eurozone, Slovenia has to formulate a Stability 
Programme every year and to submit it to the European Commission and 
the Council of the EU within the European Semester. The most recent 
program was adopted by the government May 9, 2013 (Republic of 
Slovenia 2013), together with the National Reform Programme 2013–2014 
(Republic of Slovenia 2013a), which details planned reforms, mainly of a 
structural character. Both documents were the basis for the EU Council 
recommendations to Slovenia (and other countries) adopted May 29, 2013 
and approved by the Council June 19, 2013. Measures to promote growth 
include strengthening the financial sector and restructuring companies. The 
former includes transferring bad bank assets to the Bank Assets 
Management Company DUBT, which will be effected by a DUBT bond 
asset guaranteed by the government for up to 4 billion euros. In addition, 
banks will receive additional capital in order to ensure capital adequacy at a 
level comparable with the EU average. Both measures will take place in the 
third quarter of 2013. The bank recapitalization will increase government 
debt at once by estimated 900 million euros. The total increase in debt is 
estimated to mean surpassing the reference level of 60 percent of GDP 
temporarily, followed by a decrease to less than 55 percent through the 
sale or liquidation of assets acquired by the DUBT.   
Based on the Council decision of January 19, 2010, Slovenia is undergoing 
the Excessive Deficit Procedure. Accordingly, it should have lowered its 
budget deficit to GDP ratio below 3 percent of GDP by 2013. The Stability 
Programme and the resulting documents recognize that this did not occur 
and postponed the date for achieving this goal. In particular, the Stability 
Programme states as main goals of Slovenia’s fiscal policy to lower the 
deficit below 3 percent of GDP by 2014 and to achieve a structurally 
balanced budget by 2017. Moreover, government debt shall be stabilized 
below 55 percent of GDP. 
The Stability Programme envisages both reducing public expenditures and 
increasing revenues to achieve the 2014 goal. With respect to the former, it 
proposes caps on public employees’ salaries and restrictive policies on 
pensions and social transfers as well as some additional decrease of public 
consumption and investment. Should this plan not work, a crisis tax will be 
introduced January 1, 2014. Also a property tax and some other tax 
increases are planned as of January 1, 2014. Already July 1, 2013, the 
value added tax will be increased by raising the normal rate by 2 
percentage points (from 20 to 22 percent) and the lower rate by 1 
4 
percentage point (from 8.5 to 9.5 percent); this was done as planned in the 
meantime.  
In the Stability Programme the results of a forecast for the Slovenian 
economy are reported which show the effects of the planned measures on 
its main aggregates. According to its authors, this was done using a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. However, no alternative 
scenarios are presented; hence it is not possible to evaluate the 
advantages and disadvantages of the strategy chosen by the Slovenian 
government. Furthermore, an alternative forecast with a different model can 
be regarded as desirable in order to check for the robustness of the 
forecast.  
Therefore in this paper we use our own model, SLOPOL9, a Cowles 
Commission type macroeconometric model to simulate alternative 
scenarios for the Slovenian economy, both without and with the measures 
of the Stability Programme and under further alternative assumptions about 
fiscal policy. We are particularly interested in the trade-off between budget 
consolidation and growth enhancement through fiscal demand 
management. This may also serve to provide some information about the 
possibilities and limitations of fiscal policy in stabilizing the business cycle 
in a small open economy within the Euro Area. As the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy has become a subject of research again recently, it may also 
be a modest contribution to this debate (see, for instance Coenen et al. 
2008, 2012, Cogan et al. 2010, Taylor 2009).      
 
 
3. The SLOPOL9 Model 
 
The simulations for the present paper were conducted with the 
macroeconometric model SLOPOL (SLOvenian POLicy model, version 9). 
In this version, SLOPOL9 has 71 equations of which 27 are behavioral. The 
econometric estimations are based on quarterly data for the period 1995q1 
to 2011q4. More details about the model including equations and variable 
definitions can be found in Weyerstrass and Neck (2013). Earlier versions 
were used to simulate macroeconomic policy scenarios during (Neck et al. 
2012) and after (Blueschke et al. 2012) the “Great Recession” and to 
determine optimal policy paths in an economic crisis (Neck et al. 2011); 
SLOPOL9 was used to simulate effects of alternative policies designed to 
deal with the problems of an aging society and financing the pension 
system (Weyerstrass and Neck 2013). 
SLOPOL9 contains behavioral equations for the goods, financial, and labor 
markets. The demand side of the economy is modeled in more detail and 
has therefore more influence on the development of the macroeconomic 
variables than the supply side; hence the model can be classified as 
primarily of the Keynesian type. Real GDP and its expenditure components 
(exports, private and public consumption, gross fixed capital formation), 
imports, prices, wages, interest rates, employment, and labor supply are 
determined endogenously. In addition, the public sector and the population 
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structure are modeled in detail. As unit root tests identify almost all 
variables as integrated of order one, most equations are specified as error 
correction models with the growth rate of the respective variable over the 
same quarter of the previous year as the endogenous variable. 
Private consumption depends on real disposable income and on the real 
long-term interest rate, combining the traditional Keynesian view with more 
modern consumption theories such as the permanent income hypothesis. 
Disposable income includes both wage income and yields from financial 
wealth. Income from wealth is determined by multiplying the stock of 
financial wealth by the average interest rate. Financial wealth is 
extrapolated with the growth rate of the nominal capital stock.  
Gross fixed capital formation is influenced by final demand (the accelerator 
hypothesis), by the user cost of capital, and by capacity utilization. The user 
cost of capital is approximated by the real interest rate and the depreciation 
rate on the capital stock. Including the ratio between actual and potential 
GDP (the macroeconomic capacity utilization rate) expresses the idea that 
higher net investment becomes necessary when the utilization of the 
existing capital stock increases.  
Real exports depend on world trade and on the international price 
competitiveness of Slovenian goods and services on the world market. The 
latter is approximated by the real effective exchange rate vis-à-vis 
Slovenia’s 41 most important trading partners. The real exchange rate 
depends on nominal exchange rates and on consumer prices. Real imports 
are influenced by domestic demand and by the real effective exchange 
rate.  
Employment depends on real GDP and on the real gross wage. The 
employment function explains the employment rate, i.e. the number of 
employees in relation to the total working age population rather than the 
employment level. Labor supply by private households is determined by 
multiplying the labor force participation rate by the working age population. 
In a behavioral equation, the participation rate is positively related to the 
real net wage. The positive coefficient implies that the positive substitution 
effect of an increasing net wage dominates the negative income effect. 
Wages are determined in an extended Phillips curve equation. Hence, 
gross wages depend on consumer prices, labor productivity and the labor 
market situation. Labor market tightness is captured by the difference 
between the actual and the structural unemployment rate. The consumer 
price index (CPI) is determined by exogenous and endogenous factors. For 
a small open economy like Slovenia, international raw material prices are 
important determinants for the domestic price development. This is taken 
into account by including the import deflator in the consumer price 
equation, together with the wage rate as the dominant domestic price 
determinant. The deflators for private and for public consumption are 
related to the CPI. In view of the high import content of exports, the export 
deflator is explained by the import deflator, in addition to unit labor costs as 
the most important domestic cost factor. The import deflator is influenced 
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by the oil price in euro, where the oil price approximates international raw 
material prices in general. 
The equation for the short-term interest rate takes into account that 
Slovenia was not a member of the Euro Area during the first years of the 
period for which data were used for estimating the equations; the country 
joined the Euro Area in 2007. Before the recent crisis, the short-term 
interest rate in Slovenia deviated only slightly from the Euro Area average 
and converged towards the Euro Area interest rate. In the model, the long-
term interest rate in Slovenia is determined by the Slovenian short-term 
interest rate and by the Euro Area average long-term interest rate. The 
latter accounts for convergence between Slovenia and the Euro Area 
average over time. As the financial crisis has clearly shown, the long-term 
interest rate also contains a risk premium which is positively related to the 
public debt level. Financial market participants, who doubt the long-term 
sustainability of public finances, demand a higher risk premium. This is 
captured by including the debt-to-GDP ratio in the equation for the long-
term interest rate. The implicit interest rate on public debt is explained by 
the long-term market interest rate.  
The real effective exchange rate vis-à-vis Slovenia’s 41 most important 
trading partners is explained by the nominal exchange rate between the 
euro and the US dollar (taking Slovenia’s Euro Area membership since 
2007 into account), the exchange rate between the Slovenian tolar and the 
euro (accounting for Slovenia’s own currency before joining the Euro Area), 
and CPI inflation in Slovenia. Even though nominal exchange rates vis-à-
vis the other Euro Area member states no longer exist since 2007, different 
price developments are relevant and important also within the monetary 
union. 
On the supply side, potential GDP is determined via a Cobb-Douglas 
production function with labor, capital and autonomous technical progress 
as input factors. Since potential GDP is a long-term concept, it is not the 
actual but the trend realizations of the production factors that are used for 
its estimation. For the factor labor, this requires the estimation of the 
structural, i.e. the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). 
The latter is estimated by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter to the actual 
unemployment rate. The NAIRU is then endogenized via a moving average 
equation. 
The model contains a number of potential fiscal policy instruments, namely 
government transfers paid to households, government consumption, 
government investment and several tax rates. In the present investigation 
transfers other than pensions are considered separately because the 
pension problem (a long term problem instead of the short term one 
considered here) was already investigated in Weyerstrass and Neck 
(2013). As Slovenia is a member of the Euro Area, its monetary policy is 
conducted by the Euro system and the European Central Bank (ECB) in 
particular and is no longer available as a national policy instrument. 
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4. Set-up of the Simulation Experiments 
 
The SLOPOL9 model was simulated over the period 2012–2020 under 
alternative assumptions about the design of fiscal policy. For the period 
2012Q1 until 2013Q2, we used historical values of the exogenous variables 
and, in a few cases, adjusted results by using add factors dealing with 
special events during these quarters in order to approximate the historical 
time paths of the main objective variables in cases where their data were 
already available (the simulations were executed during the first week of 
July 2013). For 2013Q3, we introduced a negative shock of EUR 900 
million on government debt which will come into effect due to 
recapitalization actions as described in the Stability Programme. Otherwise, 
from 2013Q3 on we created a baseline by projecting developments of the 
exogenous variables which we considered to be plausible, combining 
forecasts from the current Stability Programme, the OECD, the European 
Commission and other sources. The model turned out to be too large and 
complex to allow for optimization experiments, so we were confined to 
simulations of alternative policies. 
In order to simulate the fiscal actions of the government, several control 
variables are considered in our model. These include: 
GN – (nominal) government consumption,  
GINVN – (nominal) government investment,  
RESTTRANSFERSN - remaining (nominal) government transfers to private 
households, 
VATAXRATE - value added tax rate, 
INCTAXRATE - average personal income tax rate, 
and a summary variable increasing government revenues without influence 
on the non-public-sector variables of the model which serves to model the 
imposition of property taxation (including taxes on land) and other lump-
sum-tax-like measures that influence the primary balance positively.  
 
Here we report about four different simulation scenarios which are called 
“baseline”, “stability program”, “growth” and “cold turkey”. The “baseline” 
scenario serves as a benchmark for the other three and is meant to show 
what would happen if the government did not intervene in the current 
economic situation. It can be interpreted as experiment of government 
policy doing “business as usual”. In this scenario, the main fiscal 
instruments considered in our model, viz. GN, GINVN and 
RESTTRANSFERSN are projected with growth rates close to values of the 
recent past. Their annual rates are presented in table 1. After the drops in 
government consumption and investments in 2012, these indicators return 
slowly to the “normal” growth rate levels of around 5% per year. Transfers 
to household increase with a relatively high growth rate of 6% per year.  
 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
GN 2% 3% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
GINVN 2% 3% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
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RESTTRANSFERSN 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 
  
Table 1: growth rates for main fiscal instruments in the “baseline” 
scenario 
 
Tax rates are not changed; the planned further decrease of the corporate 
income tax rate is assumed to be suspended. The global variable world 
trade volume, which drives the development of exports, is assumed to grow 
at moderately positive rates but not to return to pre-crisis growth. Euro 
interest rates remain low, and the euro-dollar exchange rate remains 
roughly constant, as does the oil price. 
 
The “stability program” scenario simulates the policy recommendations 
described in the most recent Slovenian Stability Programme and the 
National Reform Programme 2012–2014. As discussed above, the package 
described in these documents and approved by the government contains a 
number of restrictive fiscal policy measures. On the one hand, a reduction 
of government expenditures is planned, which we assume to amount to 
negative growth rates as given in table 2. Note that we assume that 
government purchases of goods and services are temporarily reduced in 
2014 and 2015, while transfers are assumed to be kept constant over the 
entire simulation period (which accords with the Stability Programme).  
 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
GN 1.5% -7% -4% 1% 2% 3% 4% 4% 
GINVN 1.5% -7% -4% 1% 2% 3% 4% 4% 
RESTTRANSFERSN 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
  
Table 2: growth rates for main fiscal instruments in the “stability 
program” scenario 
 
On the other hand, several policy actions are intended to increase 
government revenues, such as an increase of VAT by 2 percentage points 
(starting already in 2013Q3) and several additional revenue-side measures 
such as the introduction of a property tax in 2014Q1. As the Stability 
Programme is not specific about the quantitative size of these measures, 
we assume that they shall increase government revenues by about EUR 
300 million per year, which corresponds to the envisaged volume of the 
“crisis tax”, an emergency measure to be introduced only if expenditure 
cuts cannot be enacted as planned.  
 
The “growth” scenario analyzes the effects of an expansionary fiscal policy 
which aims at increasing the level or the growth rate of real GDP and 
decreasing the rate of unemployment at almost any cost in terms of fiscal 
stability (government deficit and debt). Table 3 shows the growth rates of 
the main fiscal policy instruments for this scenario. In addition, the 
government is assumed to decrease the average personal income tax rate 
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by 1 percentage point starting in 2014. As this scenario runs counter to all 
announced government plans in Slovenia, it is not to be regarded as a 
realistic option; in fact, it would probably be met with sanctions from the EU 
immediately. Instead, it serves as standard of comparison with the “stability 
program” scenario, in particular as to the relative costs of expansion versus 
austerity.   
 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
GN 2% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 
GINVN 2% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 
RESTTRANSFERSN 6% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 
  
Table 3: growth rates for main fiscal instruments in the “growth” 
scenario 
 
The “cold turkey” scenario simulates the effects of a still more ambitious 
program than the Stability Programme, namely a way of quick restructuring 
of public finances, with the target of a balanced budget starting already in 
2014. To achieve this objective, fiscal policy design contains the same 
measures on the income side as the “stability program”, viz. an increase of 
VAT by 2 percentage points starting in 2013Q3 and the property taxation 
measures as described above. On the expenditure side, the actions are 
also more restrictive than in the “stability program” scenario as shown in 
Table 4. The figures result from an equal reduction, in terms of nominal 
expenditures, of government consumption and transfers, with a smaller 
reduction of government investment, which has higher multipliers than the 
other two categories of public expenditures. 
 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
GN 1.5% -14% 0% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 
GINVN 1.5% -7% -4% 1% 2% 3% 4% 4% 
RESTTRANSFERSN 0% -27% 18% 8% 6% 0% 0% 0% 
  
Table 4: growth rates for main fiscal instruments in the “cold turkey” 
scenario 
 
The main purpose of considering this scenario is an evaluation of the 
relative advantages of a shock therapy as compared to a more gradualist 
approach towards budget consolidation. The “cold turkey” scenario 
assumes that policy makers want to achieve a balanced budget 
immediately at nearly all cost in terms of output and employment lost. Of 
course, we abstract from political obstacles to such a policy which will be 
highly unpopular with the voters, especially because of the drastic (though 
temporary) reduction of transfers in 2014. 
Figures 1 to 3 show the development of the expenditure side policy 
variables in the four scenarios considered. Note that the time paths of the 
main components of government expenditures, viz. public consumption 
GN, public investment GIN and exogenous transfers RESTTRANSFERS, 
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are different in all scenarios, with the main bulk of budget consolidation 
assumed to be borne by transfers and public investment being least 
affected. This reflects the normative orientation of this analysis, aiming at 
an evaluation of the Stability Programme by comparing its effects with 
some alternative. For a positive analysis, probably public investment would 
be more subject to cuts as examples in other countries show. Unfortunately 
those government expenditures which can most easily be reduced 
politically are those which exert the largest multiplier effects on GDP and 
employment.    
 
 
Figure 1. Government consumption (GN) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Government investment (GINVN) 
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Figure 3. Exogenous transfers (RESTTRANSFERSN) 
 
 
 
5. Results of the Simulations   
 
Considering the effects of different paths of fiscal policy instruments, it is 
convenient to concentrate on two groups of variables which are objectives 
for the Slovenian policy makers and are influenced through the channels of 
the macroeconomic model. First, we have to consider the targets of full (or 
high) employment, output or income growth, and price stability. These 
variables are relevant for policy makers in any country and also explicit 
goals of the Slovenian government. To them, one could add the goal of a 
balanced current account; however, in a monetary union this has less 
relevance than otherwise, and the simulations show that all scenarios result 
in a current account surplus, so this does not provide severe problems 
during the period under consideration. Budget consolidation measures 
affect real GDP and its growth more directly and employment and 
unemployment indirectly, both in an adverse way. The effects on the price 
level and on inflation are more indirect as these variables depend primarily 
on monetary policy which is not under the control of national policy makers 
in Slovenia. 
The second group of objectives can be dubbed public finance objectives. 
They include, in particular, the government budget surplus and the public 
debt, both of which are contained in the EU Stability and Growth Pact and 
of high relevance in the current situation of the European debt crisis. 
Slovenia displayed reasonably low values of deficit and debt in the years 
before the “Great Recession”, but this is no longer true since then, hence 
the need for budget consolidation. Thus we expect a trade-off between debt 
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and deficit on the one hand and GDP (level and growth) and employment 
on the other. The simulations show the extent to which this trade-off exists. 
In Figures 4 to 9 we show the time paths of the objective variables. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Real GDP growth rate 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Real GDP  
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Figure 6. Inflation rate 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Unemployment rate 
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Figure 8. Budget balance in relation to GDP 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Debt level in relation to GDP 
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expansionary course of public expenditures would allow for positive GDP 
growth rates in every year from 2014 on. 
However, the simulation results for the “stability program” scenario shows 
that the optimistic forecast for real GDP growth is not markedly deteriorated 
by adopting the measures of the Slovenian Stability Programme. As Figure 
4 shows, the restrictive fiscal policies of that program reduce GDP growth 
only temporarily and by not more than 1 percentage point. This conclusion 
is reinforced by the very expansionary fiscal policies of the “growth 
scenario”. On the other hand, the budgetary goals are dramatically 
improved by the measures of the “stability program” policies, and even 
more when compared to the “growth scenario”. Figure 8 shows that the 
baseline scenario results in ever increasing budget deficits of up to 9 
percent of GDP in 2020, and the “growth scenario” even requires deficits of 
up to 14 percent. From Figure 9 we can see that these two scenarios lead 
to public debt increases up to more than 100 and 120 percent of GDP 
respectively, in contrast to the convergence of the “stability program” 
scenario to a debt-to-GDP ratio of only slightly more than the reference 
value of 60.  
A similar conclusion applies to the effectiveness of expansionary fiscal 
policy with respect to unemployment (Figure 7). The two expansionary 
scenarios (baseline and “growth”) reduce the rate of unemployment by not 
more than three quarters of one percentage point as compared to the 
“stability program” scenario. Although this does not imply complete 
ineffectiveness of countercyclical fiscal policy, it would require an extremely 
strong preference for growth and employment to justify the sacrifice of 
sustainable public finances for such small gains. Of course, the long run 
effects of such expansionary policies cannot be captured by these 
simulations, but it may be conjectured that they point even more towards a 
prudent and cautionary fiscal stance. Interestingly, the rate of inflation is 
virtually not affected at all by fiscal policy (Figure 6), which is to be 
expected for a country without a national monetary policy. 
Finally, the “cold turkey” scenario gives similar results as the “stability 
program”, except for a faster reduction of the budget deficit and a full 
convergence to the debt target value. The adverse effects on growth are 
stronger at the beginning as expected, but only in 2014. Already in 2015 
until the end of the simulation period, growth is stronger in this scenario 
than in the “stability program”. The “cold turkey” shock can be regarded as 
an investment into the future, with higher sacrifice at the beginning and 
higher payoff at the end.   
Altogether, the simulations show that fiscal policy is not very effective in 
increasing output and employment and the gains from an expansionary 
policy are fairly small, with a high price to be paid in terms of financial 
instability. The measures of the Slovenian Stability Programme are seen to 
be a reasonable way of leading the economy of that country out of the debt 
crisis, although our simulations are somewhat less optimistic than the 
forecasts of the Stability Programme. Of course, still more studies of this 
kind are required to arrive at firm conclusions regarding desirable or even 
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optimal policies. However, the fact that a predominantly Keynesian model 
tends to prescribe cautious fiscal policies points toward some robustness of 
the conclusion about the limited usefulness of an expansionary fiscal policy.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we investigated the trade-off between the needs for budget 
consolidation and the desirability of expansionary fiscal policies as a means 
of demand management. The simulations show that for the Slovenian 
economy an expansionary fiscal policy is neither feasible nor desirable: it 
leads to unsustainable government debt and has only weak effects on 
income and employment. Therefore it seems that the Stability Programme 
and the related policy prescriptions of the EU are not only more realistic but 
also more desirable than the proposals of some Keynesian authors. At 
least under our econometric model, for the Slovenian economy Taylor’s 
(2009) recommendation of sticking to the automatic stabilizers instead of 
pursuing a discretionary fiscal policy seems to be fully justified.  
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